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SOME IMPORTANT EVENTS IN 1946
THE NUERNBERG TRIAL
Quincy Wright
The author is professor of International Law in the University of

Chicago.

During 1943 to 1944 he was Consultant to the Foreign

Economics Administration of the State Department. He is Director

of the Foreign Bondholder's' Protective Council; author of "Legal

Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict" and of many leading contributions to the periodical literature of his profession.-EDITOR.

The Nuernberg trial began on November 20, 1945 and
ended on October 1, 1946 with the sentencing of twelve of the
Nazi defendants to death by hanging and seven to imprisonment for terms ranging from ten years to life. Schacht, von
Papen and Fritzsche were acquitted. The Control Council for
Germany considered applications for clemency for most of
those convicted but did not grant them, and carried out the
execution for those sentenced to death on October 16, with the
exception of Martin Bormann who had not been found, and
Hermann Goering who had committed suicide a few hours
earlier.
The Tribunal composed of a judge and an alternate each
from the United Kingdom, the United States, the U. S. S. R.
arxd France, based its judgment upon the Charter agreed upon
by the four powers on August 8, 1946 and later accepted by
nineteen others of the United Nations. The Charter defined
as crimes the preparation, planning, initiation and waging of
aggressive war; conspiracy to that end; war crimes in the narrow sense; and crimes against humanity, including wholesale
massacre and enslavement of civilians in pursuance of aggressive war. The Tribunal found that these acts were recognized
as individual crimes in customary and conventional international law which bound the defendants when the acts charged
were committed. It also found declaratory of preexisting international law, the provisions in the Charter which denied to
persons accused of these crimes the defense that they were justified by state authority or superior orders. "Acts of state" or
"superior orders" which were themselves beyond the state's
competence under international law had never, the Tribunal
held, conferred immunity for crime. The Tribunal also found
that the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Charter was supported by accepted principles of international criminal law and
by the authority of the four powers in their capacity as the
government of Germany. The Tribunal thus denied the charge
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made by the defendants and by others that it was administering

ex post facto law.
In reaching its judgment, the Tribunal weighed the testimony of over a hundred witnesses, considered several thousand
documents presented in open court, and examined a number
of affidavits and interrogations taken out of court. The oral
record occupied 17,000 pages and the judgment itself 283 pages.
The Tribunal took especial pains to give the defendants opportunity to obtain the counsel of their choice and the witnesses
and documents relevant to their defense, and to argue the legal
problems through counsel and in person. The procedure constituted a model for an international criminal tribunal.
The judgment gives precision to the principles of international law which have developed during the past generation in
the effort to "outlaw war." The meaning of "aggressive war,"
both as an international delinquency and as an individual
criminal offense, and the international law concerning superior
orders, acts of state, criminal conspiracy and criminal organization were clarified.
President Truman pointed out that "this precedent becomes
basic in the international law of the future," and remarked in
opening the United Nations General Assembly in November,
1946, that the members were bound by the law of Nuernberg
as well as by the law of the United Nations Charter. While
opposition to the trial and the judgment has been expressed in
some quarters, both on the ground that it was novel and on the
ground that the sentences were in some cases too lenient, legal
opinion has generally considered the trial and its results important contributions to international law and to the organization
of the world for peace.

THE "BROOKLYN PLAN" OF DEFERRED
PROSECUTION FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
Charles H. Z. Meyer
Charles H. Z. Meyer is Federal Probation and Parole Officer in
Chicago. He received his Ph. D. degree in Sociology from Northwestern
University, and for the last fourteen years has been in social service
work, mostly in the Federal Courts and Department of Justice. For
four years he has taught in the Department of Sociology, Central
Y.M.C.A. College, Chicago. He is a member of a number of committees
and professional councils in Social Welfare and socio-religious activities.-EDITOR.

In the area of rehabilitating the offender, one of the pioneering ventures of the year 1946, was that which is sometimes
referred to as the "Brooklyn Plan" of voluntary probationary
supervision without trial or conviction in federal criminal
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cases. It was first tried in the federal court of Brooklyn, N. Y.,
as an experiment, but in January 1946, the Attorney General
of the United States authorized all United States attorneys to
make use of the new procedure when juvenile offenders are
involved.
While "prosecution deferred" is not a new technique in some
juvenile or domestic relations courts, it is a new experiment
in federal juvenile practice. Before 1938 all children charged
with a federal offense were processed as adults in the federal
courts; that is, by indictment, jail detention, trial, presentence
investigation by court officer if ordered, and finally sentence,
either to a reformatory or on probation. After 1938 the indictment was made unnecessary in juvenile cases, and public court
trial was not imperative. A juvenile could be brought before
the court on criminal information only, and could be heard in
chambers, if he signed a waiver of formal prosecution. This
is followed by a formal court order either sentencing the child
or placing him on probation. This court order leaves a record,
a stigma on the child even though fingerprints are not permitted to be taken.
According to the Brooklyn experiment, however, the juvenile
case is processed by the district attorney and probation officer
working together prior to prosecution to determine whether
or not prosecution is necessary. Prosecution is deferred for a
week or so by the United States attorney who refers the matter
to the probation officer for a pre-prosecution investigation,
study and written report of the background of the juvenile
offender and his possible culpability. The information for this
report is secured in the same manner that data is collected for
a presentence report for the courts, but this pre-prosecution
report may never get to the courts. On the basis of the findings,
the United States attorney decides whether or not to defer
action for a definite period. If he decides not to prosecute for
the time being, he requests the probation office in writing to
exercise the disciplinary supervision of probation for whatever
length of time he designates. At intervals the probation office
prepares progress reports for the United States attorney and at
the expiration period the probation department submits a full
report and recommendation. If this report is favorable the
original complaint is marked "not entertained." The youthful
offender has no record, no criminal stigma and society has been
as well protected as if the boy had been formally placed on
probation. His compliance with regulations may have become
more spontaneously motivated under this procedure than under
the compulsory supervision of a court order.
This' method of processing a case calls for an exercise of judicial powers by the United States attorney. Administering this
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processing is left to the probation office. During the suspension
of judgment the youth is given an opportunity to demonstrate
that he is worthy to be returned into society. Of two hundred
cases supervised in this manner in Brooklyn only two violators
had to be referred to the courts by due process of the law. Of
this group of two hundred provisional "releasees" under deferred prosecution an appreciable number finished high school,
vocational school or college, which achievements might not
have been the case if their course of life had been interrupted
by incarceration or by the stigma of prosecution. Although
these results compliment the new procedure, it is still too early
to fully evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of this recent innovation in the federal judicial process.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
David Geeting Monroe
The author is Counsel for the Northwestern University Traffic
Institute, an Associate Editor of this Journal, and is a member of the
Council of the Section of Criminal Law of the American Bar Association. This brief account of privileges and immunities from arrest
granted nationals of other countries was prepared in response to reader
inquiries.-EDITOR.

The subject of privileges and immunities from arrest and
prosecution has always occupied an important place in the literature of the law. This is particularly observable in the field
of international relations. By general usage and the comity of
nations the person of a duly accredited foreign sovereign has
been exempted from such action by our authorities for offenses
committed in violation of the law of this land. So also has immunity been accorded the retinue of foreign sovereign authorities, ambassadors, ministers, their families and their servants.
But through the years, with an upswing of commingled international interests, the problem of adjusting our national law
enforcement needs with international interests has become an
increasingly provocative one. Gradually the privileges extended
to the selected few have broadened to encompass others. This
is to be observed, for example, in the recent Convention between the United States and Mexico, signed at Mexico City,
August 21, 1942 (Treaty Series 985) under which heretofore unusual privileges and immunities were granted consular officers:
1. Consular officers, nationals of the State by which tb ey are
appointed, and not engaged in any private occupa.tion for
gain within the territory of the State in which they exer-
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cise their functions, shall be exempt from arrest in such
territory except when charged with the commission bf an
act designated by local legislation as crime other than misdemeanor and subjecting the individual guilty thereof to
punishment by imprisonment. Such officers shall be exempt from military billetings, and from service of any military or naval, administrative or police character whatsoever.
2. In criminal cases the attendance at court by a consular
officer as a witness may be demanded by the plaintiff, the
defendant, or the judge. The demand shall be made with
all possible regard for the consular dignity and the duties
of the officers; and there shall be compliance on the part
of the consular officer.
3. A consular officer shall not be required to testify in criminal, contentious-administrative, labor or civil cases, regarding acts performed by him in his official capacity.
Note that arrest is legally justified only if the offense charged
is a felony. In respect to misdemeanors, Mexican consuls are
exempt from arrest.
Significant privileges and immunities are to be observed,
likewise, in the provisions relating to the United Nations organization. Let us examine them for they point a way and a
problem of unusual significance to coming law enforcement.
Privileges and immunities granted to the United Nations
organization and its members are found in three provisions:
the first in the United Nations Charter, the second, in Public
Law 291 (79th Congress), and the third, in Executive Order
9698 promulgated by the President of the United States on
February 19, 1946. In the United Nations Charter (Chapter
XVI, Article 105) is found this covenant:
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of 'ach of its
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and
officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the Organization.
Turning to Public Law 291 we find that Section 7 outlines the
basic national policy of immunity in the following terms:
Representatives of foreign governments in or to international
organizations and officers and employees of such organizations shall
be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts performed
by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions
as such representatives, officers or employees except insofar as such
immunity may be waived by the foreign government or international
organization concerned.
And finally, the President of the United States in his executive
order 9698 declared that the United Nations are "entitled to
enjoy the privileges, exemptions and immunities conferred by
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the International Organization's Immunities Act." Such are the
bases of privileges and immunities as they relate to the United
Nations organization.
But while the field of immunity has been broadly outlined,
the specifics remain in the field of conjecture. Such terms as
"suit and legal process," "official capacity," "falling within their
functions as such representatives," and so on are generic only.
As in other matters of the law, it must remain for judicial interpretation to explore the quantitative and qualitative horizons
of the immunities granted and to point out the specific limitations therein. The first of coming decisions was recently handed
down. It is an interesting one. And while it may not set the
precedent for later judicial action, it sheds important light on
problems involved and consequences ensuing in the proper
administration of justice.
Facts of the case at hand were briefly these: William Ranollo,
the defendant, was charged with violation of the speed laws of
the Westchester County Park Commission. At the time, and
place complained of he was an employee of the United Nations organization and was driving a car on United Nations
business and was at the time accompanied by the Hon. Trygve
Lie, Secretary-General of the organization. Defendant urged
that by virtue of the privileges and immunities conferred by
the United Nations Charter, Public Law 291 and Executive
Order 9698, that all persons accredited to the United Nations
are exempted from prosecution or suit, criminal or civil, and
without regard to the degree of offense committed. His plea
was, therefore, one of total immunity.
The court first reviewed the problems at issue. On the one
hand he said, there is no disputing the proposition that if an
international legislative body is to function properly within the
borders of a particular nation that a certain amount of immunity, exemption and privilege is necessary to insure their necessary personnel against harassment by any court proceedings,
civil or criminal, in order that the deliberations of such body
may proceed uninterruptedly and with maximum measure of
success in the interest of all. The logic is sound, the necessities
of international cooperation evidence the need. But then he
went on to point out that to recognize the existence of a general
and unrestricted immunity from suit is carrying the principle
of immunity completely out of bounds. To establish such a
principle, said he, would in effect create a large preferred class
within our borders who would be immune to punishment for
which the average American would be subject. Such a theory
does violence to the American sense of fairness and justice, is
repugnant to it, and flouts the basic principle of the United
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Nations itself, which, in the preamble to its Charter affirms the
principle of equality of all men and women.
Such is the issue raised. On the one hand is demand for total
immunity in the interests of international comity and the success of international operation; on the other, the contention
that the creation of a preferred class above and beyond the
national law imperils the fair and impartial administration of
national justice. How to harmonize one with the other is the
problem. To this end the.court in its opinion stated:
This Court feels strongly that the question of immunity under
these circumstances should be entrusted not to the whim or caprice
of any individual or committee that might speak for the United
Nations Organization, but rather that such immunity should be
available only when it is truly necessary to assure the proper deliberations of the Organization-a circumstance that could be readily
brought about if the granting of immunity were restricted to those
cases where our State Department certified that the exemption from
prosecution or suit was in the public interest.
It was therefore the decision of the court that upon the facts
in the case the defendant is not entitled to immunity as a matter of law without a trial of the issue of fact, and is accordingly required to plead to the information before the Court.
-County of Westchester on Complaint of Walter Connelly v.
William Ranollo. City Court of New Rochelle, New York,
October, 1946.

